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SECONDARY LIABILITY, SCHEME
LIABILITY, AND THE RELIANCE
FACTOR: THE SUPREME COURT’S
RULING IN STONERIDGE
INVESTMENT PARTNERS, LLC v.
SCIENTIFIC-ATLANTA, INC.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The scope of liability under Section 10(b) of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 19341 (“Act”) is a hazy area of jurisprudence for
those in academics and in the business world alike. Until recently, the
Supreme Court’s decision in Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First
Interstate Bank of Denver largely governed the area.2 Accountants,
lawyers, underwriters, and others often faced liability under Section
10(b), until the Supreme Court held in Central Bank that the
Securities Act did not reach those who aided or abetted a Section
10(b) violation.3 After Central Bank, liability attaches only to
“primary participants” in investor defrauding schemes, though

* 2009 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law.
1. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j (“It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of
any national securities exchange--(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, or
any securities-based swap agreement (as defined in section 206B of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act [15 USCS § 78c note]), any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.”).
2. Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
3. See JAMES D. COX, ROBERT W. HILLMAN & DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES
REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 760 (5th ed. 2006) (noting that aiding and abetting a
client’s conduct was itself a violation under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 for three decades).

DO NOT DELETE

2/12/2009 8:58:02 AM

282 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR [VOL. 4:281

different definitions of this term have since emerged between the
circuits.4
Thirteen years after Central Bank, both the definition and the
scope of liability for “primary participants” reached the Court for
clarification. Yet, when the Supreme Court decided Stoneridge
Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.,1 it effectively
declined either to resolve the circuit split regarding who qualifies as a
primary participant or to narrow the scope of Section 10(b) liability.
The Court, instead, simply held that the vendors who had aided a
communications company in its fraudulent public statements could
not be held liable because the investors did not rely upon the
defendants’ statements or representations. Thus, although Stoneridge
is still an unequivocally pro-business decision, the concept of scheme
liability was not rejected outright, no doubt to the chagrin of many in
the business world.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,
the Court granted review of a Tenth Circuit decision allowing private
5
aiding and abetting actions under Section 10(b). Plaintiff First
Interstate purchased bonds issued by the local authority. Central
Bank was the indenture trustee for the bonds and was thus
contractually obligated to ensure compliance with the bonds’
covenants.6 After the appraisal for the bond offering was found to be
dated, Central Bank delayed independent review of the appraisals
and the local authority defaulted on the bonds prior to any review by
Central Bank.7
Noting that the express liability provisions of the Securities and
Exchange Act do not proscribe aiding and abetting and that a private
Section 10(b) claim is an implied cause of action, the Court
determined that Congress could not have intended to proscribe such
8
activity in a private Section 10(b) claim. Accordingly, “only the
making of a material misstatement (or omission) or the commission
4. See id. at 764–70 (discussing the differing approaches taken by the varying circuits as
well as the SEC’s position).
5. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 164.
6. Id. at 167.
7. Id. at 167–68.
8. See id. at 179–80.
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9

of a manipulative act” is prohibited by the statute. Finally, the Court
noted that allowing an action for aiding and abetting under Section
10(b) would have circumvented the judicially-created reliance
requirement because there was no showing that the plaintiff had
relied on Central Bank’s statements or actions.10
Subsequent to Central Bank, two different approaches emerged
for determining whether a secondary actor can be held primarily
liable under Section 10(b). The stricter approach, opposed by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), is referred to as the
“bright-line” test and mandates that “a defendant must actually make
a false or misleading statement in order to be held liable under
Section 10(b).”11 The Second Circuit reiterated this approach in
Wright v. Ernst & Young, LLP, when it held that “the
misrepresentation must be attributed to that specific actor [making
the misrepresentation] at the time of public dissemination, that is, in
advance of the investment decision.”12
Most courts, however, use the “substantial participation” test,
which focuses on the degree of involvement the defendant had in the
making of the misleading statement. For example, the Ninth Circuit
has held that accountants and underwriters who both had a significant
role in drafting, reviewing, and editing misleading financial reports
and deliberately concealed the truth could be held liable as primary
13
participants. Similarly, the Sixth Circuit held that “while an attorney
representing the seller in a securities transaction may not always be
under an independent duty to volunteer information about the
financial condition of his client, he assumes a duty to provide
complete and nonmisleading information with respect to subjects on
which he undertakes to speak.”14
In the wake of the Central Bank decision, Congress passed the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”), Pub. L.
No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 743, which added Section 20(e) to the Exchange
9. Id. at 177 (citing Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473 (1977)).
10. Id. at 180.
11. Shapiro v. Cantor, 123 F.3d 717, 720 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting In re MTC Elec. Techs.
S’holders Litig., 898 F. Supp 974, 987 (E.D.N.Y. 1995)).
12. Wright v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S.
1104 (1999).
13. In re Software Toolworks Inc. v. Painewebber Inc., 50 F.3d 615, 627, 629 (9th Cir.
1994).
14. Rubin v. Schottenstein, Zox & Dunn, 143 F.3d 263, 268 (6th Cir. 1998).
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Act and affirmed the right of the SEC to prosecute aiders and
abettors.16 Private actors were not extended this right, in accordance
with the general themes of the PSLRA to curb abusive actions,
17
frivolous suits, and huge settlements.
The Court could have reviewed the Eighth Circuit’s decision to
resolve the circuits’ split regarding the proper test for finding a
secondary actor liable under Section 10(b). But instead, the Court
seemingly ignores much of this backdrop in its decision in Stoneridge,
though it does mention the intentions of Congress with the PSLRA
18
and the Act’s relevance for secondary actors.
III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The plaintiffs in Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. ScientificAtlanta, Inc., were stockholders of Charter Communications, Inc.
(“Charter”) who had purchased Charter shares on the open market.
This purchase led to the subsequent securities fraud class action
against: Charter; ten Charter executives; Charter’s independent
auditor, Arthur Andersen, LLP; and two equipment vendors,
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. and Motorola, Inc. (collectively, the
“Vendors”).19
The plaintiffs alleged that Charter inflated its stock price by
entering into sham transactions with the Vendors, which Charter used
20
as the basis for misleading financial statements. Specifically, the
Vendors’ arrangement with Charter “improperly inflated Charter’s
reported operating revenues and cash flow.”21 According to the
plaintiffs, the Vendors knew upon entering into these sham
transactions that Charter would account for them improperly, leading
15. See 15 USCS § 78t(e) (“Prosecution of persons who aid and abet violations. For
purposes of any action brought by the Commission under paragraph (1) or (3) of section 21(d)
[15 USCS § 78u(d)(1) or (3)], any person that knowingly provides substantial assistance to
another person in violation of a provision of this title [15 USCS §§ 78a et seq.], or of any rule or
regulation issued under this title [15 USCS §§ 78a et seq.], shall be deemed to be in violation of
such provision to the same extent as the person to whom such assistance is provided.”).
16. Codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1995).
17. Thomas O. Gorman, Vendors May Face Higher Risk When Doing Business With Public
Companies: ‘Stoneridge’ and Scheme Liability, CORP. COUNS. WKLY., Oct. 17, 2007, at 320.
18. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 772–73.
19. In re Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 443 F.3d 987, 989 (8th Cir. 2006), aff’d sub nom.
Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008).
20. In re Charter, 443 F.3d at 989.
21. Id.

DO NOT DELETE

2/12/2009 8:58:02 AM

2009] STONERDIGE INVESTMENT PARTNERS, LLC, V. SCIENTIFIC-ATLANTIC, INC.

285
22

analysts to recommend the stock based on the inflated revenues.
Importantly, the plaintiffs did not allege that the Vendors were
involved in the preparation or dissemination of the fraudulent
financial statements and press releases on which analysts and
investors subsequently relied.23
Based on Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of
Denver,24 the district court granted defendant-Vendors’ motion to
dismiss the plaintiffs’ Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Section 10(b)
claims and denied the plaintiffs’ motions for reconsideration and for
leave to amend their complaint.25 The court held that there was no
basis for the plaintiffs’ “conclusion that business partners, such as [the
Vendors], made false and misleading statements by virtue of engaging
in a business enterprise with a company such as Charter, the entity
purported to have made the statements at issue.”26
The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the plaintiffs’ focus on
Charter’s deception in publishing fraudulent financial reports and
press releases failed to allege that either Motorola or ScientificAtlanta “engaged in any such deceptive act.”27 Thus, the claims against
the Vendors had been properly dismissed “as nothing more than
claims barred by Central Bank that the Vendors knowingly aided and
abetted the Charter defendants in deceiving the investor plaintiffs.”28
IV. HOLDING
The Supreme Court affirmed the Eighth Circuit’s decision in
Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., but did
not adopt its reasoning. Instead, the Court held that because Charter
investors did not rely on the Vendors’ statements or representations,
the Section 10(b) private right of action does not reach the Vendors.29
30
The Court rejected the Eighth Circuit’s notion that Section 10b-5

22. Id. at 990.
23. Id.
24. Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
25. In re Charter, 443 F.3d at 989, 991.
26. In re Charter Commc’ns, Inc., No. 1506, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29647, at *21 (E.D. Mo.
Oct. 12, 2004).
27. In re Charter, 443 F.3d at 992.
28. Id.
29. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 774 (2008).
30. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j (West 2000) (“Employment of manipulative and deceptive
devices. It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
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required a “specific oral or written statement but did not extend to
deceptive acts and practices.”31
Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy specified that conduct,
rather than just public misstatements, can be deceptive. Indeed, the
Vendors’ conduct in the form of oral and written misstatements,
including the backdated contracts that permitted Charter’s improper
accounting, was deceptive and thus proscribed by Section 10(b).32 The
Court softened its blow, however, by claiming that the holding in the
lower court could also be interpreted as stating only that respondents’
conduct, though deceitful, was not actionable due to its lack of
“requisite proximate relation to the investors’ harm.”33 This opened the
door for the Court to examine the reliance issue on which it had
34
apparently hoped to focus instead of the exact threshold for liability.
Since the Court’s decision in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224
(1988), the plaintiff’s reliance upon the defendant’s deceptive acts has
been considered an “essential element of the Section 10(b) private
35
cause of action.” The Court stated that “a rebuttable presumption of
reliance” exists in either of two circumstances: (1) where one with a
36
duty to disclose omits a material fact; or (2) under the fraud on the
37
market doctrine. Because here the Vendors had no duty to disclose
information and because their acts were not communicated to the
public, neither presumption applied. The Court found that the
investors were unaware of the sham transactions of the Vendors that

instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) To make any
untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.”).
31. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 769.
32. Id.
33. Id. (emphasis added).
34. Notably, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Ginsburg commented at oral argument that
the reliance issue was not squarely before the Court. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 55–57,
Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008) (No. 06-43).
35. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 769.
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160–61 (3d Cir. 1986) (“The fraud on the
market theory is based on the hypothesis that, in an open and developed securities market, the
price of a company’s stock is determined by the available material information regarding the
company and its business. . . . Misleading statements will therefore defraud purchasers of stock
even if the purchasers do not directly rely on the misstatements.”).
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were then used to prepare the statements made to the public, so
investors cannot impute reliance on these transactions to the
38
Vendors.
In conclusion, the Court warned of the policy implications of
extending the implied cause of action under Section 10(b) to the
practices in question, which would “invite litigation beyond the
immediate sphere of securities litigation and in areas already
governed by functioning and effective state-law guarantees.”39
Additionally, were the Court to adopt the investors’ construction of
Section 10(b), it would revive the cause of action against aiders and
abettors authorized only to the SEC by the PSLRA.40 Finally, the
Court noted that a decision to extend the private cause of action
41
rested with Congress.
V. ANALYSIS
In the months prior to and following Stoneridge Investment
Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.’s oral arguments, many
believed it to “be the most important securities law decision in
42
years.” Others noted its potential to be the business “decision of the
43
century.” Specifically, “[a] ruling by the Court adopting the position
of either party would dramatically reshape Section 10(b) liability and
could change the way business is conducted.”44
A decision in favor of the plaintiffs and their open-ended scheme
liability theory would have permitted the Enron Litigation,45 Simpson
v. AOL Time Warner, Inc.,46 and future class actions to proceed,
“potentially imposing securities fraud liability and damage awards on
a host of companies, banks, investment banks, and other unsuspecting

38. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 770.
39. Id. at 771.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 772–73.
42. Gorman, supra note 17, at 320.
43. Posting of Thomas O. Gorman to SEC Actions, http://www.secactions.com/?p=293
(Jan. 16, 2008, 2:18PM EST).
44. Gorman, supra note 17, at 318.
45. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 482 F.3d 372
(5th Cir. 2007) (the “Enron Litigation”), cert denied., 128 S. Ct. 1120 (2008).
46. Simpson v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., 452 F.3d 1040 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. granted sub
nom. Avis Budget Group, Inc. v. Calif. State Teachers’ Retirement System, 128 S. Ct. 1119
(2008), and remanded.
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business partners of public companies.” Such an imposition was a
common concern in the majority opinion,48 as it would have forced
public companies and their securities lawyers to agonize over the
minute details of every transaction prior to a closing. This agony
would be in addition to the costliness of preventing liability through
due diligence, in addition to the unfortunate possibility that foreign
companies would refrain from doing business in the United States
under such stringent legal standards.49 Finally, a decision extending
liability to secondary actors would have directly conflicted with the
Court’s continuing efforts to “circumscribe the implied cause of
action,” consistent with its efforts under the PSLRA.”50
Conversely, the Court’s actual decision can be viewed as contrary
to the principles underlying the PSLRA, which are meant to provide a
remedy for those who actually suffer a loss in the securities realm. For
example, in many instances the secondary actors could be seen as
providing the deepest pockets for an injured shareholder, given the
primary actor’s financial distress. The Court, however, apparently
believes that this problem can be addressed by the SEC because the
Court’s decision reiterates the agency’s ability to bring fraud claims
based on aiding and abetting liability.51 The beauty of deciding
Stoneridge solely on the element of reliance is that the SEC is not
52
inhibited because it does not have to prove reliance.
Although the decision can certainly be read as pro-business,
Stoneridge is not the “decision of the century” as some had
53
anticipated. The decision was a narrow holding that merely
elaborated on the SEC’s ability to bring actions against secondary
actors but that declined to narrow the scope of Section 10(b) liability.
Had the Court upheld the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning, class actions
against issuers and others would have been demonstrably more
difficult given the limited reach of the private right of action under
Section 10(b).

47. Gorman, supra note 17, at 318.
48. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 771–73 (2008).
49. Id. at 772.
50. Gorman, supra note 17, at 319.
51. See Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 772–73 (2008) (clarifying that the preclusion of a private
claim does not preclude an SEC action).
52. Gorman, supra note 43.
53. Id.

DO NOT DELETE

2/12/2009 8:58:02 AM

2009] STONERDIGE INVESTMENT PARTNERS, LLC, V. SCIENTIFIC-ATLANTIC, INC.

289

A holding affirming the Eighth Circuit’s judgment and reasoning,
however, would have been somewhat consistent with the Court’s most
recent securities fraud decision, Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights,
Ltd., in which the Court interpreted the PSLRA to mandate pleading
a strong inference of scienter.54 The Tellabs decision demonstrated the
Court’s proclivity to interpret the implied cause of action under
Section 10(b) narrowly, while the Court’s decision in Stoneridge does
so in a somewhat less predictable manner.
The dissent noted that, given the isolated nature of the
transactions in question, perhaps a decision in favor of the plaintiffs
would not inhibit business in the manner feared.55 Specifically, “[a]
corporation engaging in a business transaction with a partner who
transmits false information to the market is only liable where the
corporation itself violates Section 10(b). Such a rule does not invade
56
the province of ‘ordinary’ business transactions.” The dissent
emphasized that when a party has so clearly violated a law designed
to protect a group of people, the victims should have their remedy in
court—even if the court must fashion the remedy via an implied cause
of action.57
The court implicitly reaffirmed its Stoneridge decision by denying
certiorari in the Regents of the University. of California. v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (the Enron Litigation) and Avis
Budget Group, Inc. v. Cal. State Teachers’ Retirement System (the
58
Simpson class actions) class actions mere days later. The disposition
of these cases is instructive given each case’s similarities and
differences from the fact pattern and decision-making in the lower
courts compared to Stoneridge.59
In the Enron Litigation, the Fifth Circuit held that the investment
bank defendants, who allegedly structured sham transactions knowing
Enron would use them in “misstating its accounts” and thus defraud

54. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499 (2007).
55. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 777 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
56. Id.
57. See id. at 779–82 (noting that the purpose of the Act is to protect investors from exactly
the sort of deceptive conduct involved here).
58. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (mem), 128
S. Ct. 1120 (2008) (denying certiorari); Avis Budget Group, Inc. v. Cal. State Teachers’
Retirement System (the Simpson class actions) (mem.), 128 S. Ct. 1119 (2008) (denying
certiorari).
59. Gorman, supra note 43.
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its shareholders, did not violate Section 10(b). The court based its
holding on the Supreme Court’s precedent in Central Bank that
61
Section 10(b) “does not give rise to aiding and abetting liability.”
This holding is startlingly similar to the decision of the Eighth Circuit
in Stoneridge; however, on the reliance issue, the Fifth Circuit reached
a similar conclusion as the Supreme Court in Stoneridge—that the
plaintiffs had not alleged that the defendants had made “public and
material misrepresentations.”62 The Supreme Court’s denial of
certiorari is significant because it leaves standing both a ruling on the
deceptive act, narrower than that reached in Stoneridge, and a win for
the defendants on the same reliance grounds as in Stoneridge.63
In Simpson, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the scheme liability
alleged by the plaintiffs combined with a fraud on the market
presumption was a sufficient Section 10(b) cause of action.64 Given
the lower court’s careful examination of reliance and the fraud on the
market theory, it is not surprising that the Court granted certiorari
and then remanded the case.65 Additionally, the Supreme Court did
not specifically reject the Ninth Circuit’s scheme liability because it
disregarded that issue and instead focused on the reliance element.
VI. CONCLUSION
Given the Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. ScientificAtlanta, Inc., decision and the succinct rulings that followed,
secondary liability under Section 10(b) remains a hazy area of
securities law. Because the Supreme Court did not specifically
renounce the concept of scheme liability when it remanded the Enron
Litigation, did not affirm it when it granted certiorari in Simpson, and
alluded that participation in a scheme to defraud may well reach the
threshold of deception in Stoneridge, plaintiffs may continue to bring
claims under the theory.

60. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA) (the Enron
Litigations), Inc., 482 F.3d 372, 386 (5th Cir. 2007).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 385–86.
63. Gorman, supra note 43.
64. Simpson v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 452 F.3d 1040, 1051 (9th Cir. 2006).
65. See Gorman, supra note 43 (The Simpson class action was remanded for further
consideration in light of Stoneridge).
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Meanwhile, the circuit split regarding the bright-line and
substantial participation tests is as pronounced as it was prior to the
Court’s undertaking of Stoneridge. What remains, then, is the critical
factor of whether a secondary actor’s deception is actually disclosed
to investors sufficient for them to show reliance. Issuers, their lawyers,
and their business partners should therefore be increasingly wary of
certain transactions’ disclosures in their SEC filings and other public
statements in order to avoid meeting the reliance requirements
adopted in Stoneridge.

